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Nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is a key concern, and evaluating
the effect of testing and infection prevention and control strategies is essen-
tial for guiding policy in this area. Using a within-hospital SEIR transition
model of SARS-CoV-2 in a typical English hospital, we estimate that
between 9 March 2020 and 17 July 2020 approximately 20% of infections
in inpatients, and 73% of infections in healthcare workers (HCWs) were
due to nosocomial transmission. Model results suggest that placing sus-
pected COVID-19 patients in single rooms or bays has the potential to
reduce hospital-acquired infections in patients by up to 35%. Periodic testing
of HCWs has a smaller effect on the number of hospital-acquired COVID-19
cases in patients, but reduces infection in HCWs by as much as 37% and
results in only a small proportion of staff absences (approx. 0.3% per day).
This is considerably less than the 20–25% of staff that have been reported
to be absent from work owing to suspected COVID-19 and self-isolation.
Model-based evaluations of interventions, informed by data collected so
far, can help to inform policy as the pandemic progresses and help prevent
transmission in the vulnerable hospital population.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
Nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the transmission of the virus within a
hospital, is a key concern inmitigating the spread of infection. The contribution of
nosocomial transmission to the spread of COVID-19 in England is not yet known
(as of February 2021), and there is variability around estimates of the riskof SARS-
CoV-2 for healthcare workers (HCWs). Hospital inpatients represent an almost
closed population where estimates of the disease latency can be used to predict
the extent to which patients develop symptoms after hospital admission owing
to progression of pre-symptomatic disease (community-acquired) versus those
that become infected through nosocomial transmission. In HCWs, however, clas-
sifying the source of infection is difficult, as they work between wards and
migrate between the hospital and community on a daily basis. Large European




2CoV-2 to range from 4% in Denmark (up to 23 April 2020) to
13.9% in Italy (up to 4 April 2020) [1,2]. English studies
at an individual Trust level (a Trust being an organizational
unit within the National Health Service, serving a defined
geographical area) have estimated the prevalence of SARS-
CoV-2 infection in HCWs in England to be between 15 and
45% for those in patient-facing roles, and 3 and 25% overall
[3–6], with some studies citing occupational differences in
infection risk [7], and others suggesting that infections
in HCWs align with community incidence rates [8–10].
When contact patterns are known, genomic sequencing
of pathogens can be used to build transmission trees to deter-
mine the origin and transmission chain of an outbreak
[11,12]. One such study in an English hospital identified
clusters of genomically linked cases between 13 March 2020
and 22 April 2020 involving 159 individuals, of which 124
(78%) were epidemiologically linked to other cases [13].
Outbreaks were identified on 12 wards, suggesting nosoco-
mial transmission. HCWs accounted for 30/159 cases.
However, these studies are resource-intensive and contact-
tracing can be imperfect [14–16]. Mathematical models of
infection transmission dynamics, when appropriately para-
meterized, rely on data that is widely collected and are a
useful tool for estimating the source of infection in a hospital
[17,18], and can subsequently be used to test hypotheses
around testing and infection prevention and control (IPC)
strategies on reducing transmission.
We present a within-hospital transmission model of
SARS-CoV-2, including patients and HCWs, and use this
model to quantify both the contribution of nosocomial infec-
tion to total infection burden within an English hospital and
the effectiveness of alternative control measures.2. Methods
(a) Model description
We present a susceptible–exposed–infected–recovered (SEIR)
transmission model of COVID-19 infection within a hospital,
with disease transmission to, from, and between both patients
and hospital HCWs. The model includes testing of suspected
cases on admission, and of symptomatic patients and HCWs
within the hospital. Patients are placed into one of four distinct
groups within the hospital: a general population for non-sympto-
matic admissions, and three test-dependent cohorts, namely,
suspected cases, confirmed-positive cases and test-negative
patients. Upon admission to the hospital, suspected COVID-19
patients are placed into the suspected cohort (awaiting test results)
and subsequently move to either the positive or negative cohort
upon receipt of test results. All admissions that are not tested are
admitted to one of the remaining hospital beds, and undetected
COVID-19 cases that enter the general hospital compartment can
infect other patients and HCWs. HCWs can become infected
either in the community, from infected patients in the hospital
(including positives in cohorts) or from other infected HCWs.
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the model.
We use model simulations to examine the efficacy of HCW
testing and patient isolation strategies.
Periodic testing of HCWs is a potential tool to prevent the
spread of infections in the hospital. We consider periodic testing
of the HCW population every 1, 7, 14 or 28 days, and assume
that an equal proportion of the population are tested each day
(so 1/7 of all HCWs will be tested every day for 7 day periodic
testing, etc.). We assume that following a positive test result,
infected and exposed HCWs are absent for 7 days.We also explore two simulated scenarios for handling sus-
pected cases as follows, with each impacting the transmission
rates to and from patients:
Scenario A (default): Suspected patients are cohorted together.
Among those suspected cases are patients who are uninfected
on admission and remain negative throughout, patients who
are infected on admission and receive a positive test result,
and those who were negative on admission but are exposed
to infectious cases through being cohorted with those who
test positive and then go on to become infected themselves.
This last group of patients receive a negative admissions test
but are infectious and can transmit to other patients in their
cohort and also to HCWs. In this scenario, transmission
can occur between patients in the testing cohort, as well as
transmission to and from HCWs.
Scenario B: Suspected patients awaiting test results are all indepen-
dently isolated using single rooms or bays within the hospital
until test results confirm whether to move them into the
tested-positive or tested-negative cohorts. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of single-room cohorting on IPC, we reduce the
parameter for direct transmission between patients in the test-
ing cohort by 25, 50, 75 and 100% in a scenario analysis. In all of
these scenarios, we assume that it is feasible for the hospital to
place all suspected patients in such single rooms or bays.
Patient to HCW transmission is unchanged from Scenario A.
(b) Assumptions
This model assumes there is no age, gender or race stratification
within patients and HCWs. Patients cannot directly transmit the
infection to other patients outside their own testing cohort, but
beyond this, there is no separation of wards within the hospital.
We define HCW to patient transmission to be transmission from
an infected and infectious HCW to a susceptible patient, while
patient to patient transmission represents transmission from an
infected and infectious patient to a susceptible patient, noting
however, that this may be mediated by (uninfected) HCWs
acting as ‘vectors’. The model assumes full immunity of patients
and HCWs once infected and therefore no individuals can be
reinfected. We also assume that all exposed patients are infec-
tious and asymptomatic (with the same infectiousness as that
of symptomatic patients) and progress to the symptomatic state.
In the tested-positive cohort, patients are discharged on recov-
ery. Within the suspected-positive cohort we assume patients will
not be in the cohort long enough to recover from the infection and
they are, therefore, discharged infected and infectious.
We assume that all patients andHCWs are susceptible to infec-
tion at the beginning of the epidemic and that test accuracy is
100%. We also assume that in the absence of testing 63% of
HCWs continue to work while infected unless tested and found
to be positive, as observed in a case study in The Netherlands [9].
(c) Parameter estimation
Themodel is parameterized for an ‘average’ English hospital with
1000 beds and 8000 HCWs to reflect the average bed size to staff
ratio in English NHS (NHSE) Trusts based on employee counts
from a sample of trusts and bed numbers obtained from NHS
records. Death rates and length of stay distributions are estimated
using the R library fitdistrplus [19,20] and data from the Secondary
Uses Service (SUS) COVID-19 dataset linked to laboratory data of
positive tests from Public Health England’s Second Generation
Surveillance System (SGSS). The death probability is estimated
by taking the mean of a polynomial fitted to the average prob-
ability of dying in hospital per year of age multiplied by the
discharge probability from the SUS dataset, where the age distri-
bution is sampled from the SUS dataset. For susceptible













































































































































[21]. Data gathered from SUS comprises all completed hospital
spells in NHSE Trusts arising from admissions over a nine-week
period from 10 March 2020 to 11 May 2020 inclusive. Age (in
years) and sex of the patient have been obtained, and length of
stay is calculated to the nearest day using recorded admission
and discharge dates. This amounts to a total of 119 000 positive
admissions of patients who at some time (before the data extrac-
tion data on 29 June 2020) have tested positive for COVID-19,
and 1.6 million negative admissions of patients who at no time
(before 29 June 2020) have tested positive for COVID-19. Day
cases, where the length of stay is zero, are excluded before deriv-
ing the distributions, leaving 93 000 positive admissions and
660 000 negative admissions. The length of stay distributions for
positive and negative admissions are fitted using a Weibull distri-
bution, adjusting for age and sex. Suitable values for transmission
parameters between patients and HCWs are selected to quantitat-
ively and qualitatively reproduce data from individual Trusts in
different regions of England, with differential case-loads. To
reflect the variability in case-loads and efficacy of infection control
measures between Trusts, we include in the scenario andsensitivity analyses the impact of varying the rate of admission
to hospital and transmission rates from zero to twice the calibrated
values. This results in model runs that span the range of outcomes
observed in the NHSE Situation Report (https://www.england.
nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/uec-sitrep/urgent-and-
emergency-care-daily-situation-reports-2020-21/) data (electronic
supplementary material, figure S1B).
The results presented are representative of regional averages
and based on data from 9March 2020 to 17 July 2020. The observed
incidence rate in the community is likely an underestimate of the
true incidence rate in the community population and therefore
the results presented here could underestimate the contribution
of community acquisition to infections in HCWs and also to the
admissions rate of unidentified cases. However, policy changes
advocating testing all patients on admission that were introduced
at the end of April 2020 support the inclusion of only a small
number of asymptomatic admissions, as in this study.
The full model code, differential equations, parameter values






Simulations are initialized with a start date of 9 March 2020 and
run for 130 simulated days, giving an end date of 17 July 2020.
Admissions rates for symptomatically and asymptomatically
infected patients are proportional to the regional average
admissions rate per bed for the North East and Yorkshire
region (taken to approximately represent a ‘medium’ incidence
region). These are obtained by fitting a smoothing spline to the
newly admitted cases data from NHSE Situation Report data
from 23 March 2020 to 17 July 2020, and predicting dates earlier
than 23 March using the spline and the ‘predict’ function in R
(electronic supplementary material, figure S1A). Admissions
rates of exposed patients that are not yet symptomatic are
assumed to be 0.0025 multiplied by the admissions rate of symp-
tomatic cases (i.e. for every 400 symptomatic patients that are
admitted, one asymptomatic case is also admitted) based on
the ratio of predicted prevalence in the population and hospital
admissions. Population incidence rates (for community acqui-
sition of infection by HCWs) are estimated by fitting a
spline to raw data from the PHE Coronavirus tracker data
(https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/). It should be noted that the
observed incidence rates are largely dependent on the availability
of community testing and are, therefore, highly uncertain. To gen-
erate results that are generalizable to all regions, we explore high,
medium and low incidence populations by multiplying the
incidence rate and admissions rate by a factor of 2 (high), 1
(medium) and 0.5 (low) when generating our results (electronic
supplementary material, figure S1A).
(e) Uncertainty analyses
Uncertainty analyses are performed on parameters for which
data are not available or are uncertain by generating 1000
random parameter samples and running the model with each
parameter set. The parameters varied are: a, the probability a
symptomatically infected HCW will self-isolate for 7 days with-
out being tested; bH2H, bH2P, bP2H, bP2P, the scaling factor of the
transmission rate (β) for transmission from HCWs to HCWs,
HCWs to patients, patients to HCWs and patients to other
patients, respectively; and hi, the scaling rate for the admissions
rate of symptomatic cases (number of patients admitted per
day = regional average × hi). Parameters are randomly sampled
from a uniform distribution with a minimum of zero and a maxi-
mum of double the calibrated value. Under each parameter set,
we simulate the nosocomial spread of SARS-CoV-2 from 9
March 2020 to 17 July 2020, randomly selecting admission rates
from a single region in England for this analysis prior to the
start of the simulation by drawing a region at random from the
set of all English regions. Subsequently, partial-rank correlation
coefficients (PRCC) are used to calculate the most significant
parameter values using the spartan R package [22].( f ) Model validation
We validate the model against patient data from the NHSE
Situation Report and patient and HCW data from four indivi-
dual NHS Trusts in England. The number of known cases in
the simulations replicates the proportion of beds occupied by
COVID-19 patients longitudinally (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1B). To validate model results we compare
against detailed data from an individual NHSE Trust (electro-
nic supplementary material, figure S2), and for further
validation of HCW results, we compare against PCR swabbing
data from four NHSE Hospital Trusts (electronic supplemen-
tary material, figure S3), allowing for variability due to
unknown detection rates in the Trust. Varying transmission
rates and community incidence result in feasible dynamics of
HCW infection.(g) Calculating the next-generation matrix and the
within-hospital basic reproduction number
We use the approach of Heesterbeek and colleagues [23] to calcu-
late the next-generation matrix (NGM) for transmission between
hospitalized people E, those suspected to have infection (Ex),
those who test negative (Ey) and HCWs (Ehcw). This provides the
reproduction numbers between different hospital population
groups, given as the number of secondary infectious people gener-
ated by a typical infectious person in a given subgroup in the
hospital population (for example, hospitalized patients) among
people in another hospital population subgroup (for example,
HCWs). Thewithin-hospital basic reproduction number (R0) is cal-
culated as the dominant eigenvalue of theNGM. The reproduction
numbers is calculated using 1000 randomly sampled values for the
unknown parameters (a, hi, bP2P, bP2H, bH2P, bH2H) and we calculate
the resulting 95% range.3. Results
(a) Nosocomial transmission to patients and healthcare
workers
We simulated nosocomial infections in patients and HCWs at
a typical English hospital from 9 March 2020 to 17 July 2020
under Scenario A with the assumptions that 37% of sympto-
matically infected HCWs are absent for 7 days following
infection, and neither patients nor HCWs can be reinfected.
We considered three different admissions rate/community
incidence scaling factors: low, medium and high. Under a
medium admissions rate/community incidence rate, new
cases arise at a maximum rate of 0.0278 per bed per day at
the peak of the epidemic, resulting in 11.43% of all patients
being infected with SARS-CoV-2 over the simulation period
(figure 2a,b). The vast majority (95.6%) of admitted patients
are susceptible on admission, and of the 13 075 susceptible
admissions under this setting, 243 (1.8%) acquire a nosoco-
mial SARS-CoV-2 infection over the simulation period
(figure 2c). The major source of infected patient cases of
COVID-19 is admission of symptomatic cases from the com-
munity. However, the proportion of all patient cases of
COVID-19 that are nosocomial in origin increases over time
as the number of admissions from the community declines
(figure 2e,f ). Over the simulation period, the proportion of
all patient cases that are nosocomial is 20.0%, and the pri-
mary route of nosocomial transmission to patients is from
other patients—accounting for 84.6% of all nosocomial
cases, and 16.6% of all cases (figure 2i,j ).
Over the same time period, a total of 5.2% of all HCWs are
infected (figure 2d ), with a maximum of 33 HCWs infected at
one time (0.41% of all staff, figure 2g), and a maximum of 18
HCWs absent owing to self-isolating with a true COVID-19
infection (0.21% of all HCWs). Unlike patients, in HCWs noso-
comial transmission from both patients and other HCWs
accounts for themajority of infections (37.1 and 36.2%, respect-
ively, figure 2i,j), and the routes of the acquisition remain stable
throughout (figure 2h). Although a higher number of patients
have a nosocomial infection, proportionally the burden of
nosocomial transmission is greater in the HCW population
(figure 2i).
Scaling the admissions rate bya factor of 0.5 (low incidence)
reduces the maximum rate of new cases to 0.0148 per bed per
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Figure 2. Sources of COVID-19 transmission in hospital. (a–d ) Effect of population incidence rates on nosocomial transmission. (a) New COVID-19 positive patients
per bed per day, (b) cumulative proportion of all admissions that are COVID-19 positive, (c) cumulative proportion of susceptible admissions that acquire COVID-19 in
hospital, (d ) cumulative proportion of HCWs that are infected with SARS-CoV-2. (e–h) Sources of infection in patients (e,f ) and HCWs (g,h) for a setting with a





total number of infected patients to 6.3% (figure 2b), 24.4% of
which are nosocomial (1.1% of all susceptible admissions, elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S4A, and figure 2c).
When scaling by a factor of 2 (high incidence) these results
are a maximum of 0.0518 new cases per bed per day, 20.1%
of all patients infected and 16.2% of all infections caused by
nosocomial transmission. The proportion of all admissions
that acquired an infection in hospital is 2.9% (figure 2a–c).
Under the same incidence scaling factors, the proportion of
infected HCWs is 3.3% in a low incidence setting, 36.6% of
which were nosocomial, and 7.7% in a high incidence setting,
65.2% of which are nosocomial (figure 2c and electronic
supplementary material, figure S4A).
The number of secondary infections among patients
resulting from a typical HCW is 0.00003, secondary cases in
HCWs from a typical HCW is 0.217, secondary infections
in HCWs from a typical patient is approximately 0.0001
(given that 91% of exposed asymptomatic patients are on a
general ward), and in patients from a typical patient 0.44 (if
suspected patients make up a small proportion of the popu-
lation) (figure 2e). The overall within-hospital R0 is estimated
to be 0.42 (95% CI 0.4, 0.45).
(b) Efficacy of periodic testing of healthcare workers on
nosocomial transmission events
Daily testing is themost effective at reducing transmission,with
a reduction of 103 transmissions over the entire simulation
period (25.4% of total transmissions) (figure 3a). The biggest
proportional reduction is to HCWs, where there are 36.9%fewer transmissions overall, and 72.9% fewer HCW to HCW
transmissions. There are 16.9% fewer transmissions to patients
overall, and 72.5% fewer HCW to patient transmissions.
Despite the relatively high efficacy in reducing transmissions,
daily testing is highly inefficient, requiring over 4 million tests
to be performed over the simulation period for a single hospital,
resulting in an efficiency rate of 0.0001 transmission event
reductions per test (figure 3b). The most efficient testing scen-
ario is periodic testing every 28 days which required only
37 142 tests and reduces overall transmissions by 5.4% (22
transmissions total), transmissions to HCWs by 7.9%, and
transmissions to patients by 3.6% generating an efficiency rate
of 0.0006 transmissions prevented per test, six times higher
than daily testing, but the efficacy (i.e. total number of trans-
missions prevented) is approximately 5 times lower. Testing
every 7 days results in 57 fewer transmissions, 35 to HCWs
(20.4% of total transmissions to HCWs), and 22 to patients
(9.3% of total transmission to patients), required 148 571 tests,
and has an efficiency rate of 0.0004, 1.8 times less effective
than daily testing but 2.6 times more effective than testing
every 28 days. Testing every 14 days results in 37 fewer trans-
missions, 23 to HCWs (13.4% of total transmission to HCWs),
and 14 fewer transmissions to patients (6.1% of total trans-
missions to patients), required 74 285 tests, and has an
efficiency rate of 0.0005. The 14 day periodic testing is 2.8
times less effective than daily testing, 1.8 times less effective
than 7 day periodic testing and 1.7 times more effective than
periodic testing every 28 days.
For low incidence scenarios, testing of HCWs has a similar
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Figure 3. Effect of periodic testing of HCW on transmissions. (a) Cumulative number of transmissions by source (bars) and proportional reduction in transmissions to
patients and HCWs (lines) when periodic testing is implemented from 9 March 2020 to 17 July 2020. (b) Total number of tests required under each testing scenario
(bars) and overall reduction in transmissions per test ( points) from 9 March 2020 to 17 July 2020. (c) Proportion of all infected staff that are absent from work under
different testing scenarios (left), and the proportion of infected staff that continue to work each day (right). (d ) Proportion of staff that are ever absent due to a





but in ahigh incidence scenario, themaximumreductionof trans-
missions is 18.3% (electronic supplementary material, figure
S5A). In a scenario where the probabilities of transmission
events from HCWs are lower, daily testing of HCWs could still
reduce overall transmissions to the HCW population by as
much as 20%, and in a scenario where transmission from
HCWs is twice as high (e.g. in the absence of adequate PPE), test-
ing could reduce transmission to HCWs by up to 76%, and to
patients by 49% (electronic supplementary material, figure S7).
Periodic testing of HCWs significantly reduces the pro-
portion of HCWs who continue to work while infected. In a
high, medium or low incidence setting, the maximum pro-
portion of infectious HCWs that are self-isolating in a single
day in the absence of testing is around 55%.When daily testing
is introduced, 87% of infectious staff are off work, and for
periodic testing every 7, 14 or 28 days this proportion is
72, 66 and 61%, respectively (figure 3c and electronic
supplementary material, figure S5B). Testing does not signifi-
cantly impact the proportion of staff absent from work with
even daily testing only resulting in a maximum of 0.3% of all
staff (24 individuals) absent fromwork in a single day (figure 3c
and electronic supplementary material, figure S5B). The
reduction of transmissions per absence is greatest when the
testing rate is 28 days (i.e. when there are more infected staff)
at an almost 70% reduction in transmission per absence, and
lowest when the staff are tested daily (figure 3d).
(c) Efficacy of single-room isolation versus cohorting of
suspected cases on nosocomial transmission events
The majority of nosocomial infections under Scenario A (sus-
pected COVID-19 positive patients cohorted together) are
caused by (direct or indirect) patient to patient transmission
(figure 2i,j ). This suggests that improving IPC mechanismswithin hospitals would be effective in lowering the rate of
nosocomial infections in the inpatient population, which
would subsequently reduce the number of HCWs infected.
To explore this hypothesis, we simulated a situation where
instead of cohorting suspected-positive patients together, sus-
pected patients are isolated in single rooms or bays within a
hospital while they wait for their test results to come back,
taking on average 1.18 days (electronic supplementary
material, table S1). In a medium incidence setting, there
are fewer nosocomial infections under Scenario B (placing sus-
pected cases in single rooms/bays) than Scenario A (group
cohorting of suspected cases) under different levels of trans-
mission reduction (figure 4a). The reduction in transmissions
increases linearly with efficacy, with 24 fewer transmissions
when the probability of transmission is reduced by 25%
(5.9% of all transmissions under Scenario A) to 97 fewer trans-
missions when transmissions from patients within the same
cohort is reduced by 100% (24.1% of all transmissions under
Scenario A), with the largest effect on transmissions to patients
(8.2–35.3% reduction compared with Scenario A). The number
of single-room or bay bed days required over the entire simu-
lation period under Scenario B is approximately 1564, and
the reduction in transmissions per single isolation bed day
used ranges from 0.015 to 0.062 (figure 4b), with the majority
of reductions coming from patient to patient transmissions.
The maximum number of single rooms or bays required at
any one time is 28 under a medium setting (49 for a hospital
in a high incidence setting) (figure 4c and electronic
supplementary material, figure S6C). At the peak of the
epidemic, the majority of these rooms are occupied by true
cases, but as the community incidence declines a higher pro-
portion of single rooms are occupied by susceptible
individuals (15.4% versus 74.7%). These trends are echoed in
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Figure 4. Effect of isolating suspected cases in single rooms versus cohorts. (a) Number of transmissions (bars) and proportional reduction in transmissions (lines)
when patients are isolated in single rooms and transmission rates are reduced by various amounts. (b) Reduction in transmissions to patients and HCWs per single
bed day over the entire simulation period. (c) Number of single rooms occupied per day by patients undergoing testing for COVID-19 who are susceptible, infected or





material, figure S6), and also under scenarios where trans-
mission rates from patients are scaled up or down by a factor
of 2 (electronic supplementary material, figure S7).(d) Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses
We performed an uncertainty analysis to determine the effect
of variability around parameters related to admission of
infected cases, transmission and staff isolation rates as
described in Methods (electronic supplementary material,
figure S8). Under this range of parameter values, the tem-
poral dynamics of known COVID-19 cases in all hospitals
can be captured (electronic supplementary material, figure
S1B). We demonstrate that up to 20.3% of all beds in a
Trust are filled with known COVID-19 cases at the peak of
the epidemic (mean 5.7, s.d. 3.8, electronic supplementary
material, figure S1A). Overall, the mean proportion of all
cases that are nosocomial under these parameter sets is
17.4% (s.d.13.4), with a maximum of 2% of all patients that
are susceptible on admission developing an infection in hos-
pital at the peak of the epidemic. In a medium incidence
scenario, however, the mean proportion of patients that
develop an infection in hospital is less than 1% (mean 0.93,
s.d. 0.72; electronic supplementary material, figure S1B).
To assess the sensitivity of the number of patient and
HCW transmissions that are nosocomial in origin to the
parameters of interest, we calculated PRCCs temporally (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S8C). Early in the
simulation when community admission rates are high, patient
to patient transmission rates drive the number of nosocomial
infections in the patient population and this is demonstrated
by high PRCCs (0.625–0.75) for the parameter bP2P at early
timepoints. However, as the admission rates drop there is an
increasing role for HCW to patient transmission, indicated by
the increasing PRCCs for parameters bH2H and bH2P at latertimepoints. The number of nosocomial transmissions in the
patient population is strongly influenced by the admission
rate (hi) through the entire simulation. The self-isolation rate
of symptomatic HCWs (a) has a minor, non-significant effect
on the number of nosocomial infections in patients. For
HCWs, patient to HCW transmission rates and the admission
rate of infected patients are influential throughout the simu-
lated time period, and there is an increasingly important role
for HCW to HCW transmission at later time points.4. Discussion
Using an SEIR model of transmission, we studied the potential
sources of SARS-CoV2 infections in a simulated ‘average’ Eng-
lish hospital with 1000 beds and 8000 HCWs. Our results
suggest that while themajority of cases in hospitalized patients
are a result of community acquisition of the virus, direct and
indirect patient to patient transmission drives nosocomial
infection. Furthermore, the majority of cases in HCWs were
not found to be community-acquired, but instead driven by
nosocomial transmission. This is in contrast to an earlier
study that suggested that the rate of asymptomatic infection
among HCWs more likely reflects general community trans-
mission than in-hospital exposure [24], although the
proportion of infected cases observed by other studies such
as Treibel et al. [24] is in line with estimates presented in this
study. More detailed genomic epidemiology studies are
required to disentangle the source of transmissions to HCWs.
Through the NGM approach of [23], we estimated that the
within-hospital R0 is 0.45, suggesting that the epidemic
within hospitals is not self-sustaining and would die out
within four generations without infectious admissions. Both





8Given that HCW to HCW infections were identified as a
primary contributor to nosocomial infections in the HCW
population, we evaluated the potential for periodic testing
to reduce infection. In our simulated hospital, we considered
a scenario where the entire workforce is tested every 1, 7 or 14
days, and a positive HCW result leading to isolation at home
for 7 days from the date of the test (figure 3). We observed
only a small proportion of HCWs absent at any one time
(up to 0.3%) owing to testing positive, which is considerably
less than current observations, which are in the region of 25%
of staff absent owing to suspected COVID-19 infection or self-
isolation (NHSE Situation Reports). This would, therefore,
suggest that testing HCWs routinely is unlikely to cause an
unsustainable decline in the number of available workers.
There is also a trade-off between reduction in transmission
and efficiency, with the most efficient testing scenario only
20% as effective as the least efficient.
We suggest that HCW testing will have a moderate effect
on patients (up to 16.9% fewer infections from HCWs) but a
larger effect on HCWs (up to 72.5% fewer HCW to HCW
transmissions, and 36.9% fewer HCW infections in total).
This is supported by findings by Grassley et al. [25], who
suggest that regular screening can prevent transmissions in
hospitals and other care facilities, and Chin et al. [26], who
suggest that lower-frequency HCW testing is ineffective in
reducing transmission.
We find IPC measures, specifically patient isolation, in
hospitals to have a larger effect of up to a 72% reduction in
nosocomial transmission events to HCWs (figure 4).
The management of suspected cases on admission to hos-
pital has the potential to significantly reduce the rate of
nosocomial infection. Our model suggests that managing
symptomatic patients in single rooms or bays that are fully dis-
infected in betweenpatients could reduce nosocomial infection
rates byup to 24.1%,with a 35.3% reduction in transmissions to
patients. If only symptomatic patients are isolated, amaximum
of 2.7% of all beds are required to be single rooms in amedium
incidence setting when tests have a turnaround time of
approximately 28 h; however, in a higher incidence setting
this could be as high as 4.8%. If the turnaround time for testing
was reduced, the number of beds required, and the number of
nosocomial infections, would fall. In a scenariowhere a higher
number of patients had illnesses, such as influenza, that could
result in them wrongly suspected of having COVID-19 owing
to the similarity of symptoms, a higher number of beds would
be required. In practice, as the criteria for patients to be tested
change to include larger cohorts of patients, it may not be poss-
ible to use single rooms or bays, and in this scenario cohorting
patients by suspected infection status would become the most
practical option for preventing transmission. Controlling and
minimizing the risk of nosocomial transmission can limit the
development of further infections and their subsequent effects
on community transmission [27,28]. These results have impor-
tant implications when considering the design of temporary
facilities such as the Nightingale Hospitals [29]. While the
model is parameterized using the best data currently available,
data on contact patterns (of different groups) of HCWs with
COVID-19 patients would improve parameterization and
increase certainty in outputs. Simulationswith increased trans-
mission rates from patients and HCWs give qualitatively
similar results to what we have observed here but the values
change depending on the exact parameterization (electronic
supplementary material, figure S7). A limitation of this workis that this model does not separate asymptomatic from
pre-symptomatic patients. Also, the assumption that asympto-
matic individuals are equally as infectious as symptomatic
individuals, and the absence of age, gender or race-specific risk
factorsmaynot reflect reality, and as evidence develops suchpar-
ameters can be updated. Further, the model is deterministic and
cannot account for the impact of outbreaks on individual wards,
or the sequestering of patients and HCWs onto ‘hot’ and ‘cold’
wards. Our results are based on average admissions rates for
every hospital in a particular region (number of admissions
per hospital bed); this does not account for Trusts that are special-
ists in certain areas and therefore receive a larger proportion of
COVID-19 cases than other Trusts in the same region. We have
assumed that the risk to HCWs in the community is related
only to community incidence and not increased by them being
unable to work from home or the need for HCWs to use
public transport in certain areas (e.g. London). We acknowledge
that the observed incidence rate in the community is likely an
underestimate of the true incidence rate in the community popu-
lation as a whole. Further, little is known about the transmission
dynamics between HCWs and individuals in the community
during this pandemic and it is, therefore, possible that the contri-
bution of community acquisition to the number of infected
HCWs has been underestimated. In the case where the commu-
nity acquisition rate of SARS-CoV-2 by HCWs is higher, we
would expect that our estimated transmission probability from
HCWs to otherHCWs (bH2H), and therefore the number of trans-
missions from HCW to HCW would be reduced to maintain
calibration with observed data. We have assumed a 100% accu-
racy rate of PCR testing for identifying COVID-19 cases. The
accuracy of testing and in particular the presence of false nega-
tives in the true-negative cohort would increase the risk of
transmission between patients, and to patients andHCWs; how-
ever, we would not expect the qualitative behaviours exhibited
by the model, or the results of altering transmission rates to
change significantly under reasonable uncertainty around the
accuracy of the PCR tests.
Epidemic models in which most of the parameters are con-
stant are a useful tool for evaluating the potential impact of
interventions over a fixed setting. In reality, guidance on best
practice changes regularly, and therefore to measure the true
impact of measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 inside
hospitals, certain parameters should be time-varying to reflect
the changing advice and guidance. This work focuses on a set-
ting where the protocol remains constant from baseline, giving
an upper bound on the estimate of efficacy for each scenario,
and the results should be considered in this context. The tem-
poral dynamics in this study are fixed to those from the
North East and Yorkshire region (a medium incidence area);
thus there may be a shift in the timescale of events in regions
that were affected earlier, such as London and the West Mid-
lands. This study demonstrated a marked reduction in
nosocomial transmission events through the use of HCW
screening and prompt isolation of suspected cases. The model
was calibrated to data from English Trusts during a time
period when face coverings were also introduced universally,
and this preventive measure is reflected in the transmission
probabilities. Over the course of the first wave of the pandemic,
a numberof other interventionswere introduced in theUK, ran-
ging frommore extensive use of personal-protective equipment
to rapid diagnostic testing. In combination, these measures are
likely to further reduce hospital-associated transmission of
SARS-CoV-2 in subsequent phases of the pandemic.
royalsoc
9Despite these limitations, the results from this work have
the potential to impact infection control during subsequent
coronavirus outbreaks and help inform policy intending to
reduce the number of nosocomial infections.ietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:20200268In context
The model presented in this paper was developed to assess
the impact of strategies for cohorting patients by COVID-19
status on admission to hospital, and to provide estimates
on the efficacy of testing strategies for reducing the risk of
nosocomial transmission in England. Findings, particularly
those highlighting the potential importance of healthcare
worker (HCW) to HCW transmission and impact of regular
testing, helped to inform policy decisions aiming to prevent
infection in HCWs and transmission in the hospital
setting (e.g. https://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/dl/DL(2020)29.
pdf). The analysis was performed as the UK neared the end
of the first-wave of SARS-CoV-2 infections, but in the other
work outside of the scope of this paper, the model has been
able to adequately capture trends in nosocomial infections
for different settings with differing rates of hospital
admissions of COVID-19 cases.
Several key outputs of this work have since been observed
in other studies. An independent study from Public Health
England estimated the risk over the entire first wave to be
approximately 1% [30]. In this work, we determined that the
risk of an individual patient contracting a nosocomial SARS-
CoV-2 infection was in the range of 1–3% meaning 0.6–2.5%
would be symptomatic and therefore likely to be detected.
We also demonstrated that only high-frequency HCW testing
was efficacious at reducing transmissions within the HCW
population, a result thatwas echoedbyothermodelling studies
[25,26]. A study by the Health and Safety Investigation Branch
identified the potential for HCW to HCW transmission to
occur while in the hospital, supporting our modelling results
which suggested that over the first wave, HCW to HCW trans-
mission was responsible for approximately a one-third of the
risk to an HCW [31]. Further, the REACT-2 study determinedthat HCWs were twice as likely to test positive for SARS-
CoV-2 antibodies as the general population [32], indicating
that the risk to HCWs on shift should be greater than that in
the general community. This result was also reflected in our
model parameterizsation.
We highlighted several limitations in this work including
the lack of a distinction between asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic patients, the assumption of 100% accuracy of
PCR -testing and that patients are not sequestered into
wards based on their infection status. Through further model
developments, we are addressing these issues to allow more
complex experimentation, including greater insight into
routes of transmission within the hospital setting, alternative
patient testing strategies and implications of test characteristics.
Current indications are that results from the updated and
extended models echo those presented in this work.Data accessibility. Full model code and parameter values can be found in
electronic supplementary material, File. Population incidence rates are
available from https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/. Data from individ-
ual NHSE trusts are not publicly available.
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